

C O L U M B U S D I V I S I O N O F P O L I C E

USE OF FORCE ANALYSIS – YEAR END REVIEW

2021





COLUMBUS DIVISION OF POLICE

MISSION STATEMENT

Guided by the Constitution, our Core Values, and steadfast adherence to ethical conduct, we are in service to safeguard the lives, property, and rights of all.

VISION STATEMENT

The Columbus Division of Police will contribute to a safer city by valuing its employees and the community it serves. The Division will be dedicated to embracing change, building relationships, and treating all with dignity while upholding the law.



Use of Force Analysis – Year End Review

Columbus Division of Police – Training Bureau

Commander Mark Lang #5015

Officer Matthew Rhyne #1711


Officer Patrick Vehr #2531

Officer Timothy Baker #2479

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USE OF FORCE ANALYSIS – YEAR END REVIEW

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The seal of the Columbus Police Department is centered in the background. It features a central shield with a ship, surrounded by the text "COLUMBUS OHIO POLICE" and "PROFESSIONALISM INTEGRITY DISCIPLINE".

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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


| | Response Incidents and Number of Officers Involved | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 |
| TOTAL (officers involved) | 242 (261) | 303 (387) | 391 (470) | 411 (512) | 438 (529) |
| Canine Bite | 4 (4) | 2 (2) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 2 (2) |
| Pushing/Causing Collision | 1 (1) | 3 (3) | 5 (6) | 6 (6) | 2 (2) |
| Strike w/ Weapon | 1 (1) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 2 (2) | 6 (6) |
| Strike w/ Hands or Feet | 39 (43) | 68 (78) | 88 (109) | 70 (80) | 103 (119) |
| Use of CEW (“taser”) | 123 (127) | 130 (145) | 158 (176) | 169 (188) | 162 (176) |
| Use of Firearm | 13 (15) | 15 (26) | 12 (13) | 16 (29) | 13 (16) |
| Use of Mace | 61 (70) | 85 (133) | 128 (166) | 148 (207) | 164 (224) |

433,669 total incidents/calls for service (911, 4545, officer-initiated combined)

- 10,649 custodial arrests (actual persons delivered to jail or a detention facility)
 - o At least 97.55% of all incidents did not involve an arrest
- 242 Level 2-8 (“tracked”) use of force incidents in 2021 (.056% of all incidents)
 - o 22.12% FEWER tracked incidents in 2021 compared to 2020
 - o 99.94% of all incidents did not involve a tracked use of force event
 - o About 2.3% of arrests involve a tracked use of force event



In 2021, there were 242 tracked use of force response incidents involving 266 officers. “Tracked” refers to uses of force from Level 2 (“use of chemical spray”) to Level 8 (“deadly force”) and includes the use of a conducted energy weapon (CEW) or other electronic device, hard empty hand control (strikes, punches, kicks), the use of an impact weapon (baton or flashlight), a police K-9 bite, and less lethal weapons such as beanbag rounds and multiple baton rounds. These uses of force are reported and tracked through the involved officers’ chains of command to Internal Affairs. The figures for 2021 are shown on the previous page along with the figures for the previous four years.



Exclusive Level 1 uses of force are those incidents in which *only* Level 1 or Levels 0 and 1 force was used. These incidents are accounted for separately, reviewed by a sergeant, and then forwarded to Internal Affairs Bureau. In 2021, there were 1,434 exclusive Level 1 uses of force. Level 1 uses of force include empty hand control, joint manipulations, grounding techniques, and pressure point techniques. Most Level 1 responses were “placed on ground/tackle/leg sweep,” (557), “arm bar” (235), and “push” (104). Overall, officers reported 97.78% effectiveness of all Level 1 techniques applied.

“Total incidents” is the context for which use of force events are viewed and includes dispatched calls for service (911 and non-emergency calls) and officer self-initiated activity. Sworn personnel responded to 433,669 total incidents in 2021. The total number of incidents does not reflect the total number of contacts officers make each year as such a figure cannot reasonably be calculated.

In 2021, about 0.056% of all incidents involved a tracked use of force event. This is lower than previous years. For 2021, this equals about one tracked use of force incident in every 1,792 incidents. There has been a steady downward trend in use of force incidents over the last nine years from a high of 0.097% in 2012.

There were 10,649 custodial arrests in 2021 – a 34.6% decrease from 2020. The custodial arrest figure represents the total number of times an individual was arrested and delivered to a jail or detention facility. There are individuals who are represented more than once in that number because of multiple arrest incidents which occurred independently throughout the year.

Total incidents and the number of custodial arrests are the primary figures by which use of force incidents are compared. Not all uses of force are delivered to an arrestee but comparing use of force incidents to arrest figures allows for consistent comparison over time. There are instances in which a use of force has been delivered to an individual or group with the intent of dispersing the group (without an arrest being sought or greater force being reasonable). Or force may be reasonably delivered to an individual who ultimately is not taken to a detention facility, is not charged, or is able to evade custody all together.

In 2021, 99.94% of all incidents did not involve a tracked use of force and 99.61% of all incidents involved no force at all. Assuming all tracked force occurs during an arrest situation at least 97.7% of arrests were made without force. This is true because not every use of force event results in a custodial arrest as stated above. A better figure for comparison would be the total of officer-to-citizen contacts. Currently, the Division of Police does not track this activity. It is unlikely that such activity could reasonably be tracked accurately. The number of citizen contacts would have to be a much greater number than both custodial arrests and total incidents. Therefore, the use of force percentage when compared to these metrics would drop significantly below the figures for 2021: 0.056% of total incidents involved a tracked use of force, 0.33% involved an exclusive Level 1 use of force.

In 2021, personnel responded to or initiated, on average, to over 49 incidents per hour, or nearly 1,188 incidents every single day. Yet only 0.056% of the time did any personnel use any force.

The chart below compares demographics (including unknowns) of use of force recipients, UCR violent crime suspects/arrestees (homicide, aggravated assault, rape, robbery) and domestic violence suspects/ arrestees, and demographics for all custodial arrests. By and large, personnel are seeking contact with individuals who are suspected of a crime, not all individuals within the community.

| 2021 | Uses of Force | UCR Crimes + DV | All Arrests |
|---------------------|----------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| Female | 10.42% | 18.16% | 22.91% |
| Male | 74.51% | 81.83% | 77.07% |
| Unknown/Crowd | 15.05% | 0% | 0.02% |
| All other non-white | 6.19% | 4.50% | 0.96% |
| Black | 51.73% | 65.90% | 57.09% |
| White | 26.25% | 29.60% | 37.76% |
| Unknown/Crowd | 15.83% | 0% | 4.20% |

PART I - INTRODUCTION

Each year, the Columbus Division of Police releases numerous publications to inform the public on sworn and civilian personnel’s various activities. This publication reviews all sworn personnel’s uses of force from the previous calendar year. A report of this nature has been published annually for many years. Continuous developments in technology utilized by the Division have assisted in gathering, tracking, and monitoring various forms of information available. Not only does this allow for increasing data analysis from year to year, but also a correction of previous years’ use of force data as needed. This analysis can also help identify concerning trends with respect to all aspects of policing, not just uses of force. The continued application of these technologies to examine data-driven measures enhances transparency and accountability, could improve crime prevention strategies, and helps the effort that Division resources can be used more efficiently.

This report provides an analysis of completed Use of Force Reports and Use of Taser Reports, and provides in-depth analysis of the use of Conducted Energy Weapons (hereinafter “CEW”) for calendar year 2021. A use of force is internally defined as “the exertion of energy or the actions of personnel in the performance of their duties used to direct or control another’s movements or actions.” This report generally covers uses of force from levels of control two (“use of chemical spray”) through eight (“deadly force”) as defined by the Division Directives. A small section of this report also examines Level 1 responses (“empty hand control, pressure points, grounding techniques, and joint manipulations”) with respect to overall uses of force, as well as officer and subject injuries resulting from Level 1 responses. This report does not examine Level 0 responses except for those also involving the CEW. Level 0 responses alone are generally not, by policy, reported by personnel. Level 0 responses include officer presence, verbal and non-verbal commands, searching, and handcuffing. These techniques are not reported unless there is a complaint of injury. Other Level 0 responses of displaying or sparking the taser for compliance, display of firearm, use of flashbangs and multiple baton rounds *as diversions*, and the use of the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) warning tone are reported.

While this report does examine all tracked uses of force, it is considered most detailed with respect to the use of a CEW, and least detailed with respect to deadly force – officer involved shooting incidents specifically. Officer-involved shooting incidents, deadly force incidents in which some other non-firearm instrument was used, and other incidents involving any suspect death are discussed more thoroughly in the Firearms Review Board report and the Critical Incident Response Team (CIRT) report respectively. All these reports taken together are the most

complete assessment of all uses of force by sworn Division personnel in the previous year. These reports taken together are necessary to help identify policy changes needed, to identify knowledge and application deficiencies, and to direct personnel training and development.

The data for this report are gathered from various sources throughout the Division including Premier One offense and incident reporting, computer-aided dispatch (hereinafter “CAD”) information, the Internal Affairs database, and completed Division forms such as the Division Use of Force Report and Use of Taser Report, and raw data compiled by both the Human Resources Bureau and the Research and Development Unit.

This report starts with an examination of the statistics and demographics of the Division of Police personnel in Part II. Recruit training, annual in-service training, defensive tactics training, and firearms training is discussed in Part III. Part IV discussed the Columbus and greater Central Ohio population demographics and dynamics. Part V assesses incident and arrest data for 2021 and compares those figures to the past five years.

Part VI of this report compares uses of force each year from 2017 to 2021 and considers basic factors that may have contributed to any changes. Part VII analyzes CEW usage in depth. Part VIII examines law enforcement related injury incidents – those events involving an officer and at least one suspect or arrestee in which either the officer, or the suspect or arrestee is injured. Part IX provides additional information and analysis with respect to crime suspect and victim demographics. These demographics have a direct impact on who Division personnel come in to contact with, and by extension, who could be a recipient of an officer’s use of force. Conclusions and recommendations are discussed in Part X.


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PART II – AGENCY STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT

On December 31, 2021, there were 2,121 individuals were employed directly within the Division of Police as either sworn officers, non-sworn police recruits, or civilian employees. Police cadets are not included in this figure. Overall, this was 220 fewer total employees than at the end of 2020. Of these 2,121 employees, 1,816 were sworn personnel, 73 non-sworn police recruits, and 232 were civilians. In 2021, two classes of police recruits (the 134th and 135th) graduated from the academy and began field training as sworn officers.

The sworn ranks are comprised of approximately 89% men and 11% women. The racial breakdown of sworn personnel is: 87% white; 10% black; approximately 1% (each) Asian or Hispanic, and less than 1% each Indian, Other, or Unknown. The national average for women serving as a sworn police officer is 12.6% for all law enforcement agencies in the United States. The national average racial makeup of officers is 72.8% white, but only 59.9% white when corrected for the population. Nationally, black or African American law enforcement officers account for about 13% of the total number of officers (according to DataUSA.io). This has remained steady since about 2007. Overall sex and racial diversity within the Columbus Division of Police is unchanged from the last two years at about 11% female and 13% overall non-white. However, there has been increasing diversity among the last six classes of police recruits. Nearly one quarter of the classes started in 2018 are a sex or racial minority. Over 30% of the two recruit classes that started their training in 2019 are a sex or racial minority. The recruit classes in 2020 continued the trend and were the most diverse classes to date. The 2021 recruit classes continued this trend of diversity with 30% of recruits being a racial minority and 25% of recruits being female.

Sworn personnel were broken down into the following ranks as of 12/31/2021 (from highest to lowest): Chief: 1; Assistant Chief: 1(added 06/25/2021); Deputy Chief: 6; Commander: 18; Lieutenant: 56; Sergeant: 223; Officer: 1510. About 60% of sworn personnel are assigned to two patrol subdivisions – Patrol North and Patrol South. About 58% of sworn personnel were assigned to Patrol in 2021. Restructuring in 2019 led to many operational assignments being diverted to non-Patrol subdivisions but a portion of those reassignments have roles akin to a traditional patrol function such as mobile crisis interventionists, therapy dog handlers, and the Rapid Response Emergency Addiction and Crisis Team (RREACT). About 20% of sworn personnel are assigned to different Subdivisions containing Bureaus whose primary function is investigative.



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PART III – TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

Training within the Division of Police is broadly divided into two different categories: recruit training and advanced training. Recruit training is all the training at the beginning of an officer's career including the initial field training period. Advanced training is all training received after the initial training period (roughly the first probationary year after completion of the basic academy). The City of Columbus had traditionally not allowed lateral transfers of any kind for police officers or any sworn personnel to ensure that every sworn member of the Division had attended and graduated from the Division's Recruit Training Program at the beginning of their sworn career. However, there have been some personnel who graduated from the Division's basic training academy as a member of an outside agency who were later hired as a sworn member of the Division of Police. In those limited cases, those individuals completed additional City-of-Columbus-specific coursework, and then entered the Field Training Program.

The Recruit Training Program is an Ohio Peace Officer Training Commission (OPOTC) accredited academy. OPOTC has continually added required training hours over the past five years. In 2016, OPOTC mandated 681 hours – a more than 22% increase in hours since the previous update in 2013. As of 7/1/2019, OPOTC mandates 737 hours. Beginning in 2016, new recruits receive over 1,110 total hours of training in Columbus before being sworn in and graduating. These new officers then have a total of 15 weeks of field training, divided in to four periods called coaching phases, in which they work with specially trained, experienced officers. Upon successful completion of the coaching phases, newly sworn officers return to the Academy for two weeks of training including Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training (40 hours), and 40 hours of additional training including the topics of domestic violence enforcement updates, Narcan administration, legal updates, traffic control, juvenile justice, peer assistance and wellness, public corruption task force, pursuit policy, and communications.

Annually, all sworn officers receive a variety of advanced training and continuing professional development. The minimum number of hours mandated, topics to be covered, and practical application exercises required varies depending on where the mandate originates. All sworn personnel must complete training as mandated by: OPOTC; CALEA (the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies); statutory requirements as enacted by the Ohio General Assembly in addition to those from OPOTC; order of the Mayor – new training or topics for all City of Columbus employees; order of the Chief of Police; Bureau, Section, or Unit SOP. Officers may also elect to attend training as staffing and operational needs allow.

Since 2013, officers received a minimum of nearly 28 face-to-face hours of ethics and bias training, eight hours of de-escalation training (not including hours received in defensive tactics training), and eight hours of training focusing specifically on dealing with the mentally ill and those in crisis or experiencing trauma. These topics are also covered in annual defensive tactics training as well as various mandatory online training.


Annually, personnel typically attend five firearms qualification phases to shoot a minimum score on each phase: OPOTC course (Phase I), OPOTC and City shotgun courses (Phase II), City of Columbus off-duty course (Phase III), the “decision” course (target acquisition/recognition; shoot/don’t shoot) (Phase IV), and the City of Columbus duty course (Phase V). In 2021 there were only three phases of qualification – Phases I through III. Additionally, each year personnel must demonstrate sufficient knowledge of firearms policy and chemical spray policy. Personnel must have passed the policy exam which was given during firearms Phase II in 2021.

Finally, all officers ordinarily attend yearly defensive tactics training to demonstrate proficiency in defensive tactics, and to demonstrate use-of-force policy knowledge. In 2021, sworn officers completed annual defensive tactics in-service training where the following subjects were covered: annual taser user (re)certification including taser deployments, subject approach and control, takedown techniques, wall pin techniques, handcuffing techniques from the ground, two officer control techniques from the ground, intermediate weapon transition drills and multiple live training scenarios. The scenarios included active shooter response/building search techniques, emergency response and rendering first aid, and subject control and searches incident to arrest.

All sworn officers also completed 4 hours of first aid training as part of their annual in-service in 2021. Officers also completed on-line training in several topics including mental health, officer wellness and resilience, and annual pursuit and stopping tactics policy review.

PART IV – POPULATION DEMONGRAPHICS

The City of Columbus is the largest incorporated area in Ohio and the 14th largest city in the nation. The city is comprised of more than 226 square miles of land and nearly 6 square miles of water. While the majority of the city is within Franklin County, there are also portions of the city within Delaware and Fairfield counties. The city and the 10-county metro area continue to grow, even as other Ohio cities and metro areas experience steady population decreases.



In 2021, the city’s estimated resident population was 905,748, while the Columbus-metro population was 2,138,926. The city grew over 15% since the 2010 Census. The national population grew 7.4%; the Ohio population increased just 2.3% during the same time period. The Mid-Ohio Regional Planning Commission expects the Columbus metro area to add nearly one million additional people by 2050. The figure at left shows the continued population growth in the area from 2016 to 2021.

Based on the 2020 census estimates, Columbus population is 57.4% white alone, 29.2% black alone, and 5.9% Asian. All other racial groups including those individuals who selected two or more races accounted for about 11.4%. There was about 6.3% of Columbus’ population that identified as being of Hispanic or Latino descent, regardless of racial group. About 12.8% Columbus residents are foreign born.

As of July 1, 2021, Columbus is estimated to have 362,626 households with a median income of \$54,902. An estimated 19.1% of the resident population is below the poverty level. Although higher than the national and Ohio average, the percentage in poverty has been steadily declining.


Over 89.8% of Columbus residents 25 years or older have at least a high school diploma or equivalent education, and 36.8% have at least a bachelor’s degree. Columbus is a well-educated city when compared to Ohio in general where just over 29% of the population has a bachelor’s degree or higher.

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PART V – INCIDENT AND ARREST DATA


The Columbus Division of Police responded to 433,669 total incidents in 2021. This is approximately a 5% decrease from 2020. The 2020 figure was an 18% decrease from 2019. Both dispatched calls for service and (officer) self-initiated incidents decreased in 2021. Dispatched calls for service decreased by 2.5% and self-initiated incidents decreased 11.5%. Except for dispatched calls for service in 2017, both incident types have been decreasing since 2012. The numbers shown in the chart below represent the following types of incidents: calls for service/requests for police response received by phone including 911 or similar platforms, alarm interfaces, calls for service received via non-emergency lines or platforms, all text requests for service/response; officer-initiated activity from all sources.



In 2021 about 0.056% of all incidents involved a tracked use of force. This equals about one use of force incident in every 1,792 incidents. The 0.056% figure represents a continued decrease since 2013. The figure below summarizes total incidents in each year from 2017 through 2021, as well as the frequency of incidents that resulted in a use of force in each of the last five years.

| 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 | Study Year |
|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|---|
| 433,669 | 454,325 | 553,727 | 568,176 | 604,318 | Total Incidents (Calls for Service) |
| 1 in 1,792 | 1 in 1,499 | 1 in 1,416 | 1 in 1,382 | 1 in 1,380 | Ratio of Uses of Force to Incidents |
| 0.056% | 0.06% | 0.07% | 0.07% | 0.07% | Percentage of Incidents With Force Used |


The graph below shows the total number of incidents by precinct in 2021. The total number of incidents cited throughout this report does not reflect the true number of citizen contacts officers have each year. Instead, this is based on the total calls for service/requests for police response which includes officer self-initiated activity. Total calls for service were down nearly 5% in 2021. This included decreases in both outside calls for service and officer-initiated runs.



There were 10,649 custodial arrests made by Division personnel in 2021. The custodial arrest figure represents the total number of individuals arrested, as opposed to the number of individual charges filed. An arrestee may be charged with one or multiple statute violations, depending on law and policy, which could skew the numbers and affect the comparison from one year to another. The custodial arrest figure represents individuals arrested in any one criminal incident regardless of the number of individual charges filed.

The number of custodial arrests is the primary figure by which uses of force are measured in this report each year. In 2021, at least 99.6% of arrests were made without a use of force event as reported in this analysis. This is higher than the 96.4% of arrests made without a use of force in 2020. A better figure for comparison would be the total of officer-to-citizen contacts. Currently, the Division of Police does not track this activity. It is unlikely that such activity could reasonably be tracked accurately. The number of citizen contacts would have to be a greater number than

both custodial arrests and total incidents and would therefore cause the use of force event percentage when compared to these metrics to drop significantly below the current 12% of use of force events per arrests, and 0.056% use of force events per total incidents for 2021. Whereas the condition of having been arrested may not be applicable to a use of force event, custodial arrest numbers are used for several distinct reasons.





First, it is nearly impossible to count how many individuals Division personnel actually come in to contact with on a yearly basis. Second, it is also difficult to get an accurate count of exactly how many individuals were subjects of a use of force. For example, chemical spray and CEW “sparking” are techniques used to disperse a riotous or violent crowd. While these actions must be reported by the involved officer(s) as a use of force, the officer(s) may write “crowd” without further description as an identifier. Or force may be reasonably delivered to an individual who ultimately is not arrested and delivered to a detention facility, not charged, or is able to evade capture all together. Finally, the number of custodial arrests is a figure that is easily counted and verified, and consistently available across multiple years. For these reasons, the number of custodial arrests is used for comparison purposes.

The figures for custodial arrests in 2021 are broken down and categorized by sex (female, male, unknown) and race (Asian, Black, Native American, White, unknown). The information on arrest demographics is show both graphically on the page that follows, as well as summarized in a chart along with the percentage of change from the year prior. Arrestees of Hispanic or Latino origin are not a separate category for purposes of accounting custodial arrests here. The category “Hispanic” is included in force reporting and is therefore included in this report where applicable.


The chart on the following page shows the total arrests made over the five-year study period, with yearly change noted. The custodial arrests for each year are broken down by sex and race, with both raw data and yearly percentage breakdown given.

With respect to the racial breakdown of all arrests in 2021, there are some differences in how the data was gathered. In previous years, a separate “Hispanic” category was not calculated. Instead, Hispanic origin was an identifier separate from race category. As a separate category, Hispanic individuals accounted for 3.47% of all arrests in 2021. However, it is not possible with the current data to know which racial category these individuals would otherwise have been included. Therefore, for purposes of the chart below, Hispanic as a separate racial category was not included. The total arrests identified solely under the racial category of “Hispanic” were excluded from calculations below.


| Custodial Arrest Demographics 2017-2021 | | | | | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 |
| TOTAL (change) | 10,649 (-34.57%) | 16,276 (-38.10%) | 26,294 (-0.97%) | 26,551 (+14.31%) | 23,228 (+1.96%) |
| Female | 22.91% | 22.97% | 23.80% | 24.47% | 27.35% |
| Male | 77.07% | 77.03% | 76.17% | 75.49% | 72.65% |
| American Indian/ Alaskan Native | 0.075% | 0.08% | 0.12% | 0.09% | 0.11% |
| Asian/Pacific Islander | 0.88% | 1.25% | 0.86% | 0.96% | 0.74% |
| Black | 57.08% | 58.41% | 54.66% | 54.85% | 53.09% |
| Unknown | 4.20% | 1.04% | 2.55% | 1.40% | 1.33% |
| White | 37.76% | 39.22% | 41.86% | 42.70% | 44.73% |



It is important to emphasize that the vast majority of incidents and police-citizen interactions each year do not result in a custodial arrest, let alone a use of force. Of the 433,669 incidents in 2021, only 2.46% resulted in a custodial arrest, and just 0.056% of all incidents involved tracked a use of force. When looking only at arrests, no more than 1.19% involved a use of force event in 2021 (compared to 1.86% in 2020). On average in 2021, personnel responded to just under 1 incident every single minute of the year, or over 1,188 incidents every single day. Yet in only 0.056% of those incidents did any personnel use force – on average, less than one use of force event (levels 2-8) per 24-hour period within the entire city.



The infographic above depicts total incidents, custodial arrests, tracked uses of force, and officer-involved shootings. The total number of incidents represented by the green figures does not reflect the true number of citizen contacts that officers have each year. It is based on total incidents which includes officer-initiated activity. However, the vast majority of incidents are for calls for service/requests for police response – phone calls to 911, texts to 911, call transfers, non-emergency calls, other means of a request for police services.



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
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PART VI – USE OF FORCE ANALYSIS

A use of force response event as discussed below may involve more than one response of the same type by one or more officers. Use of force *response events*, not total *responses* or total *incidents*, are more relevant for this part. The total of response events during a single incident is dependent upon factors such as the severity of resistance, effectiveness of the tactic used, the number of subjects or officers present, and officer and subject factors and characteristics. The total response events an incident depends not only on the aforementioned criteria, but also the need to increase or decrease the level of force used as an incident progresses.

For example, assume two officers are dispatched to a disturbance at a residence (one *incident*). Upon arrival, they see three people actively fist fighting in the front yard. Despite officers announcing their presence (Level 0 response), the three parties continue fighting and assaulting one another. One officer uses chemical spray around all three subjects. This is a “use of chemical spray” (Level 2) response event involving one officer and three subjects. Two individuals stop fighting and follow officers’ commands, but the third individual makes fists and attempts to strike one of the officers. One officer attempts to strike the subject (Level 4 response) while the second officer uses a CEW (Level 3 response). This is still one incident, but now also involves a “use of CEW” event and “striking with hands or feet” event (regardless of the number of officers delivering strikes, or actual number of strikes attempted or completed by either officer).

Although such incidents and circumstances are rare, they can and do happen. Understanding the terminology is critical to understanding use of force tabulation in this report. The total number of tracked uses of force for each year in the study period is shown in different ways – either as response events or as an incident which involved some use of force – in the pages that follow. “Tracked” refers to uses of force from Level 2 (use of chemical spray) to Level 8 (deadly force).



In 2021, there were 242 tracked use of force response events. The 242 response events involved 266 officers delivering or attempting some force. By comparison, there were 303 tracked use of force response events in 2020 involving 387 police officers. There was an 18% decrease in use of force response events in 2021 when compared to 2020. Overall, there has been a steady decline in use of force events since at least 2010.

The number of use of force response events for purposes of this report is 242. However, the total number of use of force response events or total officers involved for calendar year 2021 may not be known for as long as two years or more after 2021. Use of force response events and incidents, as well as individual responses, are ordinarily not cataloged completely until there is a final disposition, i.e., until the documentation has been “tracked” completely and finalized. In some cases, there may be records added or removed due to data entry errors or duplicated entries. For other cases, particularly those involving potential serious misconduct or criminal activity, it may be two years or more from the date of the use of force for the investigation to travel up the involved officer’s chain of command and for a final disposition to be reached. While the number of use of force response events will change for 2021 as it does slightly for every year, it is not expected to change so substantially so as to greatly affect this or future analysis.

It must be noted that historical figures used in this report could be different than figures from previous years’ reports due to updated counts; and, that future reports may indicate a slightly different number of response events for 2021. The exception to this is more fully discussed in Part VII – CEW In-Depth Analysis. Generally historical numbers will not be updated in that section each year unless there are extenuating circumstances.

As in previous years, the three most frequently tracked use of force responses in 2021 were Level 2 - use of chemical spray (61 response events), Level 3 – Use of CEW (123 response events), and Level 4 “hard empty hand control” – striking with hands or feet (39 response events). In 2021 like in 2020, use of CEW was the most frequent force response. The remaining uses involved use of firearm (13 response events), canine bite (4 response events), and pushing/causing collision (1 response event). The “use of firearm” in this report is for basic information only. Officer-involved shooting (OIS) incidents are more fully discussed in the Firearms Review Board report.

In 2021, the average number of officers involved in each response event dropped to 1.1 officers. In 2020, the average officers involved in each event rose to 1.28 – a slight increase from 2019 in which there were 1.20 officers per event. This metric can indicate that officers are following policy and waiting for backup or other resources before responding to some calls for service. Or, this metric can indicate that despite the number of officers present, subjects are still engaging in resistive behavior such that a use of force is reasonable.

| | Response Incidents and Number of Officers Involved | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 |
| TOTAL (officers involved) | 242 (261) | 303 (387) | 391 (470) | 411 (512) | 438 (529) |
| Canine Bite | 4 (4) | 2 (2) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 2 (2) |
| Pushing/Causing Collision | 1 (1) | 3 (3) | 5 (6) | 6 (6) | 2 (2) |
| Strike w/ Weapon | 1 (1) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 2 (2) | 6 (6) |
| Strike w/ Hands or Feet | 39 (43) | 68 (78) | 88 (109) | 70 (80) | 103 (119) |
| Use of CEW ("taser") | 123 (127) | 130 (145) | 158 (176) | 169 (188) | 162 (176) |
| Use of Firearm | 13 (15) | 15 (26) | 12 (13) | 16 (29) | 13 (16) |
| Use of Mace | 61 (70) | 85 (133) | 128 (166) | 148 (207) | 164 (224) |

The age of the use of force recipient is reported and cataloged, when known. For Levels 2-8 "tracked" use of force response events to male subjects in 2021, the youngest was 14, the oldest was 69, and the average age was 30.81. The age breakdown for "tracked" use of force response events to female subjects was 15/50/28.11 respectively. The overall average age was

| Demographics: Level 2-8 Use of Force Response Subjects 2017-2021 | | | | | |
|--|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 |
| TOTAL responses | 259 | 454 | 390 | 411 | 438 |
| Female | 10.42% | 17.35% | 12.38% | 12.42% | 11.63% |
| Male | 74.51% | 66.44% | 73.75% | 72.30% | 69.38% |
| Unknown or Crowd/Group | 15.05% | 16.21% | 13.86% | 15.27% | 18.99% |
| Asian | 1.54% | 0.9% | 0.37% | 0.6% | 0.39% |
| Black | 51.73% | 52.3% | 48.06% | 54.99% | 51.36% |
| Hispanic | 3.47% | 2.1% | 1.48% | 2.65% | 1.16% |
| Other | 0.77% | 0% | 0.37% | 0% | 1.74% |
| Unknown or Crowd/Group | 15.83% | 18.7% | 14.97% | 15.68% | 19.38% |
| White | 26.25% | 26.0% | 34.75% | 26.07% | 25.97% |

29.46.

In the above chart, the category “unknown” for both sex and race represents different situations. The reporting officer may have been unable to report the individual’s race and sex either because such a determination cannot be made by sight, or because that person either refuses to answer when asked or provides an answer that is inconsistent with the categories available for the officer to choose. The category “unknown” also refers to situations involving groups or crowds when chemical spray is deployed, a CEW is sparked, or nonlethal munitions are used (not as a distraction or diversion). These situations can occur at large parties, bars and nightclubs, and similar locations where officers encounter large disturbances and fights; disruptive groups at festivals or other events; violent protest events; rioting; and other similar occurrences.

| Category | Incident Description | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------|------|------|------|
| | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 |
| Administrative Issue | 1 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Calls for service | 57 | 71 | 60 | 52 | 46 |
| Chain of Com Rev | N/A | N/A | 2 | N/A | N/A |
| Crime committed | 26 | 29 | 45 | 52 | 50 |
| Demonstration/riot | 1 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Disturbance/fight | 59 | 57 | 112 | 122 | 162 |
| Domestic Disturbance | 23 | 36 | 20 | 23 | 29 |
| Investigation | 5 | 3 | 9 | 7 | 5 |
| Juvenile Complaint | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Mentally ill person | 17 | 22 | 25 | 24 | 21 |
| Narcotics complaint | 0 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 4 |
| Other | 3 | 5 | 6 | 10 | 4 |
| Radio Transmission | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Routine/daily patrol | 10 | 7 | 12 | 17 | 14 |
| Tactical deployment | 5 | 4 | 17 | 8 | 10 |
| Traffic Incident | 9 | 14 | 34 | 37 | 32 |
| Vice complaint | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| Warrant served/arrest | 12 | 9 | 14 | 21 | 25 |
| Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

The table above is a numerical breakdown of the incidents by description. Note that the total incidents by description (as well as the total of incident locations and precinct of occurrence) is not equal to the same figure as the total 242 response events stated earlier. In any one incident, there may be more than one response event description depending on how the involved personnel completed paperwork, or numerous response events in one incident. Thus, the counts of the two metrics will not be identical. For an example of a situation in which descriptions are

greater than response events, suppose an incident is dispatched to a precinct cruiser (calls for service) that involved a fist fight (disturbance/fight). Further suppose the incident evolved into a barricade situation in which SWAT was called (tactical deployment) because one of the combatants had a warrant and did not want to go to jail (warrant served/arrest). If multiple officers reported multiple uses of force in this one incident, four different descriptions *could* be listed. Still, given the total of incidents descriptions is 229 compared to the total of 242 response events, it is clear that the majority of use of force incidents involve only one response event. For 2021, the most common incident type is the “calls for service.” While “disturbance/fight” has been the most common incident since 2011.

| Category | Incident Location | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|------|------|------|------|
| | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 |
| Bar | 21 | 8 | 31 | 31 | 26 |
| Business building/ property | 21 | 26 | 33 | 39 | 26 |
| Hospital | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Police HQ | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Police substation | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Police vehicle | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Private residence/property | 98 | 122 | 121 | 132 | 158 |
| Public building/property | 11 | 12 | 25 | 31 | 32 |
| Street/alley | 65 | 95 | 135 | 126 | 155 |
| Unknown/Other | 5 | 12 | 12 | 18 | 6 |

“Demonstration/riot” significantly increased for 2020. Due to the civil unrest during 2020, this increase was expected. “Chain of command review” and “radio transmission” are newer categories. Many incidents can be categorized with more than one description. It is up to the investigating supervisor to choose how best to describe an incident in which force is used.

The same is true for incident location above. For example, an incident involving force that occurs on the sidewalk and in the street in front of a restaurant/bar but stems from an incident *in* that restaurant/bar, may be categorized as “bar,” “business building/property,” or “street/alley” because all those descriptions are correct. During data entry, only one location may be entered.

The table on the previous page shows locations where an incident had occurred. “Private residence/property” and “street/alley” have been the two most common locations in all years of the study period. “Unknown” occurs because that box on the U-10.164 Data Processing Worksheet has not been checked and “unknown” is the default for data entry; or, as part of a Chain of Command Review upon complaint or information that a use of force has occurred but was not reported. There were four such incidents of this nature in 2021.

| Incident Precinct of Occurrence | | | | | |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 |
| 1 | 10 | 7 | 13 | 12 | 11 |
| 2 | 12 | 17 | 18 | 15 | 26 |
| 3 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 5 |
| 4 | 15 | 15 | 29 | 25 | 27 |
| 5 | 15 | 13 | 28 | 20 | 30 |
| 6 | 6 | 11 | 13 | 18 | 13 |
| 7 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 25 | 19 |
| 8 | 11 | 9 | 14 | 23 | 16 |
| 9 | 15 | 20 | 18 | 42 | 30 |
| 10 | 11 | 17 | 15 | 18 | 22 |
| 11 | 11 | 18 | 28 | 18 | 17 |
| 12 | 9 | 5 | 9 | 14 | 21 |
| 13 | 12 | 22 | 20 | 23 | 18 |
| 14 | 12 | 7 | 14 | 14 | 9 |
| 15 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 |
| 16 | 23 | 34 | 39 | 30 | 69 |
| 17 | 9 | 9 | 11 | 7 | 8 |
| 18 | 10 | 22 | 17 | 17 | 16 |
| 19 | 19 | 26 | 33 | 35 | 33 |
| 20 | 8 | 6 | 10 | 14 | 10 |
| Foreign | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| TOTAL | 229 | 280 | 358 | 383 | 406 |


A breakdown by precinct is shown in the table at left. Uses of force occurring in a foreign jurisdiction can be the result of a number of circumstances: an officer who initiates contact with a subject who flees from the city to a foreign jurisdiction where force actually occurs; or, a police action with force initiated as the result of a mutual aid request from a foreign jurisdiction.

A police action with a use of force outside of jurisdiction and while the officer is off-duty could be the result of intervening in an incident in which the officer is bound by law or Division Directive to intervene, for example, child abuse or an on-view crime of violence. Such circumstances are rare.


The Precincts with the three highest number of uses of force in each year of the study period are highlighted in yellow in the chart. While the

precincts with the highest number of uses of force varies somewhat from year to year, 16 and 19 Precincts have been the two highest in 2020 and 2021. These precincts were also among the highest in “total incidents.” Conversely, 3 Precinct had the lowest number of uses of force and also the lowest number of “total incidents.”


| Incident Precinct of Occurrence by Zone | | | | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| Zone/Precinct | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 |
| Zone 1 | 35 | 49 | 54 | 54 | 48 |
| 1 Precinct | 10 | 7 | 13 | 12 | 11 |
| 6 Precinct | 6 | 11 | 13 | 18 | 13 |
| 17 Precinct | 9 | 9 | 11 | 7 | 8 |
| 18 Precinct | 10 | 22 | 17 | 17 | 16 |
| Zone 2 | 47 | 55 | 62 | 93 | 67 |
| 9 Precinct | 15 | 20 | 18 | 42 | 30 |
| 13 Precinct | 12 | 22 | 20 | 23 | 18 |
| 14 Precinct | 12 | 7 | 14 | 14 | 9 |
| 20 Precinct | 8 | 6 | 10 | 14 | 10 |
| Zone 3 | 49 | 57 | 67 | 83 | 75 |
| 8 Precinct | 11 | 9 | 14 | 23 | 16 |
| 10 Precinct | 11 | 17 | 15 | 18 | 22 |
| 15 Precinct | 8 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 |
| 19 Precinct | 19 | 26 | 33 | 35 | 33 |
| Zone 4 | 42 | 49 | 81 | 66 | 88 |
| 2 Precinct | 12 | 17 | 18 | 15 | 26 |
| 3 Precinct | 0 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 5 |
| 4 Precinct | 15 | 15 | 29 | 25 | 27 |
| 5 Precinct | 15 | 13 | 28 | 20 | 30 |
| Zone 5 | 53 | 68 | 93 | 87 | 126 |
| 7 Precinct | 10 | 11 | 17 | 25 | 19 |
| 11 Precinct | 11 | 18 | 28 | 18 | 17 |
| 12 Precinct | 9 | 5 | 9 | 14 | 21 |
| 16 Precinct | 23 | 34 | 39 | 30 | 69 |




The second graph below depicts the uses of force on each Zone grouped together by year. Here, it is evident in each year which patrol zone had more uses of force than others.



The next chart shows the percentage of incidents on each precinct that resulted in a use of force, and which precincts were above or below the city-wide average. The city-wide percentage of incidents that resulted in a use of force is 0.056%. There were 14 precincts under the 0.056% level, and 6 above. Of those above the city-wide average, 16 precinct was the highest with 0.01% of all incidents resulting in a use of force.




This information is also presented for each Zone below. Patrol Zones – 1, 2 and 3 – were under the city-wide average of 0.056%. Zone 4 and Zone 5 were both above the city-wide average with Zone 4 being at .058% and Zone 5 being at .064%.



The use of force response events noted and charted in this report have historically excluded Level 0 and Level 1 response events and total responses. Included in Level 0 and Level 1 responses are de-escalation techniques. While there were 242 tracked use of force incidents 2021, there were 1,683 circumstances in which a Level 1 response was the highest level used in 2021. Unlike use of force Levels 2-8, there was also a higher number of Level 1 responses compared to the 1,183 reported in 2020 but still lower than the 1,689 reported in 2019. The 2021 Level 1 responses

amounted to an 18% increase from 2020. The overall effectiveness of all 2021 exclusive Level 1 responses was 97.78%, a slight increase over the 95.62% effectiveness in 2020. That means in 2021 there were over 1,400 circumstances in which personnel were able to resolve subject resistance without resorting to a higher level of force. For every Level 2-8 use of force response event, there are nearly four times as many Level 1 responses used to resolve a situation. Furthermore, there are undoubtedly thousands more incidents in which a Level 0 response (such as officer presence, verbal and non-verbal commands, and sparking a CEW for compliance) had been effective in de-escalating a situation thereby not requiring any “hands on” force at all.


Most Level 0 responses are not reported – only those incidents involving a CEW sparked for compliance, displaying a firearm, displaying a taser, flashbangs and baton rounds when used as



a diversion/distraction, and certain other situations involving a complaint of injury from the response (including a complaint of injury from handcuffing) are reported. Likewise, Level 1 responses are not tracked the same way that higher levels are tracked, so there is limited information. It is unknown how many higher levels of force occur after a Level 1 response has failed. Only the following Level 1 responses were studied: incidents involving *only* a Level 1 response; and incidents involving a Level 3 – Use of CEW that also involved a Level 1 response.

With respect to incidents involving only a Level 1 response events – 1,434 in total – 894 involved male suspects, 329 involved female suspects. One response involved a crowd. Where suspect sex was known, 73.09% were male and 26.90% were female. Where suspect sex was known for all tracked use of force response events, 79.24% were male, 10.59% were female and 10.17% were unknown/crowd.

The average years of service of personnel involved with a Level 1 use of force was 8.41 years. This is slightly lower than the 8.44 average years of service reported in the 2020 year-end-review. These figures are considerably lower than the average years of service for a patrol officer (11.2 years). This difference is likely due to newer officers being assigned to hours that have the highest calls for services – primarily 2nd shift hours. This may also demonstrate that an increase in de-escalation curriculum hours at the basic training level alone has a positive effect on how officers interact with subjects. Continued professional training in these areas will serve to refresh and engrain the concepts first learned at the basic training level. A change in organizational culture



can only occur over time as officers who began their careers with greater training and emphasis on de-escalation continue to mature within the organization.

Out of the 1,434 Level 1 responses, there were 43 officers injured and 38 suspects injured. The vast majority of these injuries to both officers and suspects were very minor: minor scrapes and scuffs, bruises, and small cuts requiring an adhesive bandage. There were seven officer injuries and zero suspect injuries that required medical care (hospital or physician).

2021

USE OF FORCE ANALYSIS – YEAR END REVIEW

PART VII – CEW IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS

Introduction and Background

This part analyzes Division personnel’s use of a Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW) to prevent harm to the officer or another, to effect the arrest of or gain control of a resistive or aggressive subject, or to prevent or stop the commission of a criminal offense. All CEW units in service with Division personnel are manufactured by Axon. Officers may use Division-owned units or may purchase and use an approved device in accordance with established policies.

Officers are trained to deploy the CEW in conjunction with loud, repetitive, verbal commands and allow the CEW to complete the first five-second cycle. Following the first five-second cycle, officers are trained to evaluate the subject’s actions while giving additional loud, repetitive, verbal commands to gain compliance. If the subject fails to comply or continues resistive or aggressive behavior, officers are trained to deliver an additional cycle(s) based on the subject’s actions, or to utilize some other subject-control technique if reasonable and practicable.

Methodology

The information used in this portion of the report was gathered from various sources: the Internal Affairs Bureau database; the CEW Stats database compiled by the Defensive Tactics Unit personnel; and, a close examination of the U-10.128 Use of Force Reports, U-10.128T Use of Taser Reports, and accompanying documents.

In some cases, the close examination of the completed forms reveals some reporting errors. For example, the form may indicate that one or both CEW probes missed and the CEW usage was marked as “ineffective.” However, a close reading of the accompanying narrative indicates that the subject nevertheless submitted. Therefore, the CEW was effective even though the probe(s) never contacted the suspect. It is also important to note that despite the fact the suspect was not actually contacted by any part of the CEW, the incident is still considered a use of CEW. Therefore, it is not only possible but also a reality that not all the uses of a CEW involved the CEW actually making contact with a subject.

The use of the CEW in probe mode or close quarter mode is designed to result in “neuro-muscular incapacitation” (NMI). The intended use of a CEW and the resulting NMI causes the subjected individual’s muscles to contract making purposeful movement difficult, although not impossible. Officers are trained to handcuff the subject while the CEW is cycling. “Cuffing under power” as it is called is considered an “effective” use of the CEW, and generally accomplished by more than

one officer – one who is handcuffing while the second is maintaining a hold on the CEW. However, it is important to note that even though partial or even full NMI can be achieved, the subject can still have purposeful movements including continued resistance or the use of a weapon. “Window of opportunity” is another term used to describe when to control and handcuff the subject. After the five second cycle has been completed, the body tends to relax and be less tense. This is another window of opportunity when handcuffing may be achieved. This is important to note when examining the number of cycles delivered or deployment modes utilized, especially in circumstances in which an officer is alone with one or multiple subjects or there are other factors present.

CEW Usage in 2021

There were a total of 123 CEW usage incidents in 2021. These uses by personnel on 123 human subjects were examined in detail for this report. In all incidents, there was only one subject recipient of the CEW use of force. In the 123 incidents in 2021 the CEW was deployed 150 times. Many of the incidents, 92 incidents or about 74.8%, involved only one deployment method on a subject. Other multiple-mode incidents involved one or more types of probe deployment (regular probe deployment, close quarter probe deployment) or a combination of a drive stun without probes and some form of a probe deployment.

In the 123 incidents and 150 deployments of a CEW on 123 individual subjects, there were a total of 170 cycles delivered or attempted to/on a subject. Overall, there was an average of 1.22 deployments per subject and an average of 1.4 cycles or 7 seconds attempted per subject (assuming every cycle ran for the standard five seconds). Not all attempted cycles were actually delivered to/on a subject; and not all cycles ran to completion of five seconds. Therefore, the true amount of time that each suspect endured the CEW is far less than 7 seconds. The summary below shows the total number of cycles delivered for each deployment mode.

| Cycles per subject | # Incidents | # Cycles |
|---|--------------------|-----------------|
| Deployments resulting in 1 cycle to a subject | 92 | 92 |
| Deployments resulting in 2 cycles to a subject | 23 | 46 |
| Deployments resulting in 3+ cycles to a subject | 8 | 32 |
| Totals | 123 | 170 |

In 2021, there were four incidents in which a deployment(s) method was used to deliver four or more cycles to a subject. In 2020, there were two incidents in which a deployment(s) method was used to deliver four or more cycles to a subject. In 2019, there were zero incidents in which

the subject received more than four cycles. This contrasts with 2018 when there were nine incidents in which a subject received more than four cycles. In 2017, there were zero incidents in which a suspect received more than three cycles. In previous years' reports, there was an examination into each of these incidents to determine why four or more cycles were used, or more than one deployment method was used. The reasons included heavy clothing, insufficient probe spread, probe misses, and multiple CEW's used. Similar reasons were noted for 2018: six incidents involving heavy or excessively baggy clothing; two incidents involving a malfunction or defect; one incident involved wires that broke; one incident involved the probes being too close. In 2020, the reason three or more deployments were needed was because of ineffective deployment methods when the incident started, and were followed up with effective deployment methods, resulting in three or more total cycles delivered. In 2021, the reason four or more cycles were used was used because two of the cases had ineffective initial deployments, one had to do with a suicidal individual who was armed with a knife, and the other one was a barricaded person that SWAT responded to.

In 2021, there were four incidents in which a subject was subjected by more than one CEW cartridge at one time. In all four of these incidents, the subject was engaged by two different officers. In 2020, there were eight times in which a subject was subjected by more than one CEW cartridge at one time. In seven of these incidents, the subject was engaged by two different officers, each with his or her own CEW. Of these incidents, one involved SWAT personnel. There was also one incident in which three different officers engaged the subject with their own CEW. A closer look at this incident found the subject was very obese and while the deployments were effective, they needed to deploy more cartridges to get NMI in order to handcuff the subject. There were no incidents in 2019 in which a subject was affected by more than one CEW cartridge at one time. In all but one incident in 2018, each suspect was subjected to only one CEW cartridge at a time. The one incident in 2018 involved SWAT personnel. There were no incidents of this nature in 2017.

In 2021, the CEW was effective 70.5% of the time for all deployments and cycles attempted. This is slightly down from 2020. In 2020, the CEW was effective 71.06% of the time for all deployments and cycles attempted. In 2019, the CEW was effective 77.61% of the time for all deployments and cycles attempted. 2018 resulted in a 72% effectiveness for deployments and cycles attempted, while in 2017 the CEW was only 69% effective. The 70.5% effectiveness in 2021 is slightly below the 72.25% unweighted average effectiveness of 2017-2021. The biggest difference between 2021 and each of the previous four years was a drop in drive stun applications. Drive stuns are inherently one of the most difficult applications to get effectiveness from because of the lack of NMI. We do not train specifically to use drive stuns because of this issue. Drive stuns are trained through the deployment of a close quarter probe deployment. This is done when one of the probes is missed or when the probes are too close together. Officers are trained to leave the cartridge attached to the CEW and follow-up by placing the arching unit

against the subject's body (preferably 12" away from the probes), utilizing counter pressure. DTU staff will reiterate this during phase training to not rely on drive stun deployments as the primary CEW method during the 2022 Defensive Tactics In-service Training.

| Deployment Mode | Total Actual Deployments | # Cycles | Effective % 2021 | Effective % 2020 | Effective % 2019 | Effective % 2018 | Effective % 2017 |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Probe Mode | 112 | 121 | 71% | 69% | 75% | 63% | 64% |
| Close Quarter Mode | 21 | 28 | 75% | 71% | 100% | 94% | 90% |
| Drive Stun (DS) | 9 | 12 | 58% | 75% | 81% | 95% | 69% |
| Any Mode W/ DS Follow-Up | 8 | 9 | 78% | 80% | 67% | 100% | 80% |
| Sparking for Compliance | 0 | 0 | * | 100% | 86% | 75% | * |
| Totals | 141 | 161 | 70.5% | 71% | 77% | 72% | 69% |

*This parameter not assessed or calculated in that year

In 2021, for all CEW uses in which probes were deployed in any manner (probe mode or close quarter probe mode deployment), there was a probe hit rate of 86.3%. Of the 264 probes expelled from the CEW, 228 contacted the subject. Of the 36 missed probes, all were associated with foot chases. For all CEW uses in 2020 in which the probes were deployed in any manner (i.e., probe mode deployment and close quarter probe deployment), there was a probe hit rate of 84.7%. Of 262 probes expelled from the CEW (109 probe deployments/22 close quarter probe deployments), 222 contacted a subject. Of the 40 missed probes, 38 missed probes were the result of CEW usage during a foot chase. For all CEW uses in 2019 in which the probes were deployed, there was a hit rate of just over 83%. Of 306 probes expelled from the CEW in 2019, 254 contacted a subject. Many of the 2019 misses, 48 of 52, were due to the CEW usage during a foot chase.

CEW use in Probe Mode

In 2021, the CEW was deployed in probe mode a total of 112 times. There were 121 cycles during these deployments. Of those cycles, 71% were considered effective. This is a slight increase from 2020. The CEW was deployed in probe mode a total of 109 times in 2020. There were 114 cycles delivered when the CEW was deployed in probe mode. Of those cycles delivered, 69% were considered effective. This is a slight decrease compared to 2019 CEW probe mode effectiveness.

The CEW was deployed in probe mode a total of 143 times in 2019 for 147 total cycles. Of those cycles delivered, 75%, were deemed effective. Among those cycles deemed effective there were examples of the CEW probes partially missing or completely missing the subject but the use of the CEW was deemed effective. This can be due to a subject who has complied/submitted due to the sound of the CEW, pain compliance (i.e., absence of NMI), or the belief that the CEW use had occurred or would occur, and that it was or would be effective. As to reasons for ineffectiveness, heavy clothing and use during a foot chase were listed most frequently. Some incidents did not indicate reasons for misses or ineffectiveness.

CEW use in Close Quarter Probe Mode

In 2021, there were 21 deployments of the CEW in close quarter probe mode. Of these deployments, 28 cycles were utilized, with an effective rate of 75%. This is a slight increase from 2020. In 2020, there were 22 deployments of the CEW in close quarter probe mode with a hit rate of 71%. A total of 31 cycles were delivered to the subjects. There were 22 effective cycles for an effective percentage of 71%. In 2019, there were 10 deployments with a 100% hit rate, for 14 total cycles. The effective percentage of close quarter probe deployment in 2019 was 100%.

The close quarter deployment mode, implemented in 2006, has typically been the most consistently effective method of deployment each year. Since 2017, the close quarter probe deployment method and the cycles delivered therein have had an average effective rate of over 86%.

CEW Use in Drive Stun Mode

In 2021, there were 9 drive stun deployments, with a total of 12 cycles. Of the cycles, an effective rate of 58% was reported. There was also 8 drive stun follow-up deployments in 2021. Of those deployments, 9 cycles were utilized, with an effective rate 78%. In 2020, there were six deployments involving the use of the drive stun by itself. There were four deployments when the drive stun was used as a follow up with some other deployment mode. There were 13 total cycles delivered, eight of which were delivered as a drive stun follow-up. The effectiveness was 75% for drive stuns and 80% for drive stun follow-ups. In 2019, there were 17 total deployments involving the use of the drive stun by itself. There were nine deployments when the drive stun was used as a follow up with some other deployment mode. There were 33 total cycles delivered, 17 of which were delivered as a drive stun with no other deployment method, and eight which were delivered as a follow up. The effectiveness was 81% and 67% respectively. In 2015, it was noted that of the four ineffective cycles that year, three were due to a lack of counter pressure being applied by the officer. Without counter pressure, the subjects had been able to move their body away from the CEW causing the drive stun to be ineffective. The lack of counter pressure has been addressed and retrained during the DTU in-service phase training every year since 2012.

Demographic Data on Subjects

The average overall age of a subject who received a CEW cycle in 2021 was 30.82. The average age of a male was 30.55. The average age of a female was 31.5. When looking at the average age by race, the average black subject was 28.84 years old (n=69). The average white subject was 36.25 years old (n=34). The average Hispanic subject was 28.6 years old (n=4). The average Asian subject was 27 years old (n=3). There was also an “other” category where the average age was 30 years old (n=1).

The average overall age of a subject who received a CEW cycle in 2021 was 27.19. The average male was 28.91, and the average female was 24.91. When looking at the average age by race, the average black subject was 25.17, and the average white subject was 33.52. The average age of the Hispanic subject was 20.5 and the average age of the Asian subject was 32.

The average overall age of a subject who received a CEW cycle in 2019 was 32.55. The average male was 32.88, and the average female was 26.99. When looking at the average age by race, the average black subject was 32.41 years (n=85), the average white subject was 34.07 years (n=53). There were only five additional individuals who were categorized as either Hispanic (n=3) or “other” (n=2). The average age was 38 and 28 respectively, but with so few cases, conclusion about age as a factor could lead to errors.

The average overall age in 2018 for CEW subjects in 2018 was 31.27 years. In 2017, the average age was 31.55 years. In 2016, the average age was 29.57, and in 2015 in which the average age was 29.72 years. Of the 143 individual subjects on whom a CEW was deployed in 2019, 135 or 94.4% were male. The figure below shows a breakdown by race and sex of the subject for 2020.


| | Male | Female | TOTAL by race |
|-------------------------|-------------|---------------|--------------------------|
| Black | 69 | 7 | 76 |
| White | 34 | 5 | 39 |
| Hispanic | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| Asian | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Other | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| TOTAL by sex | 103 | 12 | 123 |

CEW Usage 2021 – Subject Demographics

CEW Use on Intoxicated, Suicidal, or Emotionally Disturbed Persons

CEW use is permitted on individuals who are chemically impaired (drugs or alcohol, or both), display signs of emotional disturbance or distress, or are suicidal. In 2021, the use of the CEW on such individuals accounted for 47.96% of all total subjects. This is a slight increase from 2020. In 2020, the use of the CEW on such individuals accounted for 47.93% of total individual subjects. This in an increase from 2019, when the use of the CEW on such individuals accounted for 38.46% of total individual subjects. CEW usage on such individuals in 2018 was 46.67% of the total subjects. The percentage of CEW usage on intoxicated, suicidal, or emotionally disturbed had been steadily decreasing since 2016. See the table below for additional 2021 information.

In 2021, there were 59 subjects who exhibited some indication of intoxication, chronic or acute mental illness or disturbance, suicidal behavior or intentions, or some combination of these factors. In 2020 there were 58 subjects who exhibited some of these factors. In 2019 there were 55 subjects who exhibited some of these signs. Drug and alcohol influence or intoxication may



be determined by the reporting officers based on personal observation, subject statements, or witness statements. In 2021, there were 26 subjects who were classified as being under the influence of alcohol or drugs. There were 20 individuals who were classified as being either emotionally disturbed and/or suicidal. There were 8 subjects who exhibited some combination of mental or emotional disturbance or were suicidal, and who were also under some chemical influence.

Any police interaction with an individual exhibiting the signs and symptoms of excited delirium is cautioned due to the increased likelihood of serious injury or even death to the subject, injury to officers, other public safety or emergency medical personnel, or even bystanders. Excited delirium is deemed a medical emergency in which the police may be used to help control the subject so that aid can be rendered, and the patient may be brought to medical care. Serious injury or death can occur despite the use or non-use of force or medical interventions sought. The use of a CEW may increase the likelihood for medical complications. However, the use of the CEW is not contraindicated. Instead, the use of the CEW is regarded as the most effective way to gain control

of a subject displaying signs of excited delirium. It is the preferred method for gaining control of that subject while limiting injury to both responding officers, EMS personnel and bystanders, as well as the subject him/herself. Furthermore, it is imperative that these subjects can be restrained as quickly as possible, so medical aid may be provided as soon as possible. There were no incidents in 2021 in which the CEW was used on a subject who displayed signs and symptoms indicative of excited delirium. The most recent incident of this nature was 2014 in which there was one incident involving a suspected case of excited delirium. In that incident, the CEW use was effective. The use of the CEW did not result in serious medical complications to the subject. No officers were injured in that incident.


| Factor | # Incidents/# subjects | % of Total Incidents |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Chemical impairment | 28 | 22.7% |
| Alcohol only | 15 | |
| Drug use only | 13 | |
| Mental or Emotionally Disturbed | 22 | 17.9% |
| EDP (but not suicidal) | 11 | |
| Suicidal | 11 | |
| Chemical Influence and EDP or Suicidal | 9 | 7.3% |
| TOTAL | 59 | 47.9% |

CEW Target Areas and Probe Contact Locations

When deploying the CEW in probe mode, officers are trained to place the red laser aiming dot emitted from the CEW slightly below the sternum line of a subject who is facing the officer. When a subject's back is to an officer, the trained target area is from the base of the subject's neck to the subject's heels. Officers are further trained to hold the CEW in an upright (non-canted) position unless the subject's body is canted. Aiming the CEW in this manner results in a higher probability of probe hits and probe contact with large muscle groups on the subject. Contact with large muscle groups can be critical to the effective use of the CEW, and crucial in resulting in neuro-muscular incapacitation (NMI) when deployed in probe mode or close quarter probe mode. Aiming the CEW according to this training also reduces the probability of a short

“dart-to-heart” distance as recommended by Axon, the manufacturer of the CEW approved for use by Division personnel.

The target and probe contact locations have been divided into three broad categories: front, back, and side (either left or right side). Within each broad category are the distinctions of above (any areas approximately above the collar bones), midsection (approximately between the collar bones to just slightly below the naval), and below (all areas below the naval or belt line, and all areas of the arms and legs). The figure below shows these areas as they are depicted on the U-10.128T, with the addition of dividing lines to indicate the regions described above (except that the form lists the “below” area as “extremities”).



| Target or contact area | % of Total (2021) | % of Total (2020) | % of Total (2019) | % of Total (2018) | % of Total (2017) | % of Total (2016) |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| BACK | 56.93% | 63.12% | 60.44% | 56.9% | 60.4% | 60% |
| FRONT | 27.74% | 26.95% | 29.12% | 28.3% | 25.4% | 26.2% |
| SIDE (left or right) | 15.33% | 9.92% | 10.44% | 14.8% | 14.2% | 13.8% |
| Above | 7.31% | 7.09% | 15.66% | 15.7% | 13.8% | ** |
| Preferred Target Area-Midsection | 81.75% | 85.81% | 72.89% | 77.9% | 74.5% | ** |
| Below | 10.94% | 7.09% | 11.45% | 6.4% | 11.7% | ** |

**These calculations were made differently in prior years’ reports, so they are not reported here.

The table above shows a count of the target or contact areas. Incidents of complete misses or malfunctions where there is no CEW contact with the subject are not included. The follow-up drive stun location associated with probe and close quarter deployment has not been included. The figures reflect the location specifically targeted during close quarter probe deployment or

drive stun; or, in the case of probe deployment, the location of the top probe. The actual contact location may have been different due to unexpected subject movement. The totals in the table may be different than those above due to how the area is recorded.

Deadly Force Incidents

In 2021, there were 13 incidents in which the CEW was used in lieu of deadly force. In 11 of these incidents, the subject was armed with a knife. In 2 of the incidents, the subject was armed with a firearm. In all 13 incidents, the subject was either suicidal or was having a medical crisis of some type. In each of these incidents, the CEW deployment was effective in ending the threat without the officers utilizing deadly force against the individual. In 2020, there were 6 incidents in which the CEW was used in lieu of deadly force. In all of these incidents, the subjects were suicidal and threatening themselves with a knife. There were no incidents in 2019 in which the CEW was used in lieu of deadly force. In order for the CEW to be used in lieu of deadly force, personnel must satisfy the five-prong test for such use as defined by policy and training. The five prongs of the test for the use of an CEW in lieu of deadly force are: personnel have reasonable time to deploy the CEW, personnel have sufficient distance from the subject, personnel have some barrier between them and the subject, there is lethal force back-up in the event the CEW is not effective as intended and the subject threatens officers or others, and personnel must have the belief that such use of the CEW is reasonable.

In 2018 there was one notable incident in which the five-prong test was met and the CEW was used in lieu of deadly force. That incident involved an emotionally disturbed and suicidal individual who threatened harm to himself and had barricaded himself, this creating a standoff situation. SWAT officers encountered this individual and took him into custody after deploying their CEW's. The incident was resolved without serious harm to the individual, the officers involved, or bystanders.

In 2017 there were four incidents in which the CEW was used in lieu of deadly force. The CEW was used on four individuals who were deemed to be suicidal.

These incidents in which officers used the CEW in lieu of deadly force or with individuals who demonstrated suicidal or homicidal intentions serve as prime examples of how annual CEW training has benefitted officers, the Division of Police, the involved individual, and the community as a whole. These incidents serve as examples of how officers can utilize the CEW's as just one less-than-lethal force option to effectively resolve a situation and save lives.

Additional Analysis of CEW Usage

In 2021, there were no incidents that were documented that included utilizing the CEW as a spark to gain compliance. In 2021, there was one incident where the officer, in an attempt to illuminate the ground with the flashlight portion of the CEW had an accidental discharge. In 2020, there

was one documented incident of a CEW spark to gain compliance. In this incident, compliance was eventually gained from an intoxicated individual without the need for more or higher levels of force. The CEW spark was effective, and the officer did not have to deploy the CEW to gain compliance, which might have escalated the situation, and could certainly have caused some type of injury. There were several reported incidents in both 2017 and 2018 in which the CEW was purposefully used as an audible signal (“sparking the CEW”) in order to gain subjects’ compliance. In 2018, there were six uses of sparking the CEW, with five being effective. In 2017, there were two sparking uses, both of which were effective. There were also incidents in both 2017 and 2018 in which the audible signal alone, heard by a subject after one or more probes missed its target, deemed to be effective in gaining a subject’s compliance. Although there were no notes as to why the CEW use was effective even though the probes partially or totally missed the subject, the reasons given in 2015 can serve as examples of why such a phenomenon occurs. In 2015, there were incidents in which compliance was gained based on the officer’s observation and judgment that the sound of the CEW was enough to gain compliance. In other incidents, the subject fell to the ground either because of pain compliance (and not NMI) or due to belief that the CEW was or would be effective.


In both 2021 and 2020, there were no reported uses of a CEW against an animal. In 2019, there were two reported uses of a CEW against a dog. While not included in the data above, it is mentioned here because it served to resolve those situations without officers using their firearm to subdue the animal.

| YEAR | TOTAL # INCIDENTS | % change | # DRIVE STUN | % change |
|-------------|--------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| 2005 | 234 | -- | 149 | -- |
| 2006 | 220 | -6% | 183 | +22.8% |
| 2007 | 405 | +84.1% | 163 | -11% |
| 2008 | 262 | -35.3% | 149 | -8.6% |
| 2010 | 194 | -26% | 36 | -75.8% |
| 2011 | 181 | -6.7% | 56 | +55.5% |
| 2012 | 154 | -14.9% | 53 | -5.4% |
| 2013 | 151 | -1.9% | 49 | -7.5% |
| 2014 | 163 | +7.9% | 9 | -81.6% |


| | | | | |
|-------------|------------|---------------|----------|-------------|
| 2015 | 145 | -11% | 14 | +55.6% |
| 2016 | 135 | -6.9% | 6 | -57.1% |
| 2017 | 162 | +20% | 30 | +400% |
| 2018 | 169 | +4.3% | 20 | -33.3% |
| 2019 | 144 | -14.79% | 26 | +30% |
| 2020 | 121 | -15.98% | 6 | -76.93% |
| 2021 | 123 | +1.01% | 9 | +50% |

The table shows the total number of incidents for each year since the Division acquired CEW-style intermediate weapons. In previous years, there have been scenario-based exercises during yearly defensive tactics training to emphasize effective use of the CEW in various scenarios. There has also been general in-service training topics to address de-escalation. Although CEW use rose in 2017 and 2018, there is still an overall downward trend in the number of CEW incidents since the device was first issued to personnel in 2005. This is despite the Columbus population growing and officers responding to upwards of more than half a million calls for service each year. 2021 is no exception to the trend. CEW incidents did increase from 121 incidents in 2020 to 123 incidents in 2021.

The CEW is routinely issued to and used by all Patrol Subdivision personnel as well as the following non-patrol personnel: SWAT, canine officers, community liaison officers, court liaison personnel, Traffic Bureau officers, and others. Below is also a breakdown of the time of day (in four-hour blocks), and the day of the week that CEW use incidents occurred in 2021.



CEW Use - Day of Week



2021

USE OF FORCE ANALYSIS – YEAR END REVIEW


PART VIII – LE RELATED INJURIES

The following part examines two related topics: injuries to subjects and officers because of uses of force, with a focus on Level 1 uses of force; and intentional felonious assaults upon officers.

Injuries to Subjects and Officers

A review of law enforcement injury incidents is a somewhat recent addition to this annual report. This section first appeared in the 2017 year-end review. There is a distinction drawn between a subject’s injuries received because of a use of force, and those injuries occurring prior to police contact and therefore not related to the use of force. For this year’s report, Level 1 responses in 2021 with no other level of force were examined.

A Level 1 response is defined as empty hand control and includes pressure points, grounding techniques, joint manipulations, and pain compliance techniques. The Division form U-10.128 includes the following categorizations and check boxes for officers to report a Level 1 response:



mandibular angle (pressure point), escort position – locked out, arm bar takedown, jugular notch (pressure point), transport wrist lock, wrist roll, hypoglossal (pressure point), physically placed on ground, and other. The U-10.128 form is included in the addendum to this report.

For this report, an injury to an officer or subject is categorized by the authors based on the information contained in the arrest report narrative or the U-10.128. The categories for injury are: none, minor, serious. A minor injury is one that does not

require treatment or requires only very cursory treatment (adhesive bandage, etc.) typically provided at scene. Examples of these types of injuries are cuts and scrapes that do not require sutures, abrasions, minor bruising, and other non-life-threatening injuries. These injuries also

include circumstances in which EMS response is requested and treatment is provided at scene with no transport or further treatment required. A serious injury is one that requires transport to a definitive care facility, is physically life-threatening, or otherwise requires substantial, complicated, or long-term care. Examples of these injuries are broken bones, large lacerations requiring sutures, any injury resulting in loss of consciousness, or any other potentially or actually life-threatening injury.

Overall in 2021, there were 1,434 incidents in which there was a Level 1 use of force reported not in combination with some other use of force. These incidents do not include any other use of force, i.e., these Level 1 responses were not *in addition to* Level 4 hard empty hand control, etc. These incidents *do* include Level 0 responses, although those responses are not categorized or tabulated in this report. The number of Level 1 exclusive responses was higher than the 1,183 incidents in 2020.

Of the Level 1 incidents in 2021 examined for this portion of the report, 894 involved male subjects, 329 involved female subjects. One incident involved a crowd of people and two involved a suspect of unknown gender. In 2021, Level 1 responses were used on 73.09% male subjects and 26.90% female subjects for incidents in which sex is known. These percentages are consistent with 2020 in which 71.38% involved male subjects and 28.51% involved female subjects. Although there are only 1,223 total subjects listed in 2021 and there were 1,434 Level 1 uses of force, this apparent discrepancy in numbers is easily explained. An officer might have attempted multiple different Level 1 responses on one subject.

When examining Level 1 response recipients and comparing those demographics to all Level 2 through Level 8 use of force recipient demographics, there are some differences noted. Between Level 1 and Level 2-8 recipients, there are far fewer unknown Level 1 recipients. Also, in Level 1 uses of force where sex was known, 73.09% were to males with 26.90% to females. Compare this to Level 2 through Level 8 use of force response recipients in which 79.27% were male and 20.73% were female (where sex was known).

The average officers' years of service for all Level 1 incidents was 8.41 years, compared to 8.44 years of service in 2020. In 2019, the average Level 1 officer years of service was 8.36. As stated in Part VI above, this may demonstrate that an increase in de-escalation curriculum hours at the basic training level alone has a positive effect on how officers interact with subjects. Continued professional training in these tactics serves to refresh and engrain the concepts first learned at the basic training level. A change in organizational culture can only occur over time as officers who began their careers with greater training and emphasis on de-escalation continue to mature within the organization.

Race is not a metric collected on the U-10.128 Use of Force report. Often age may be unknown even when sex and race are known or presumed. So, the age and racial makeup of all subjects


receiving force is not always available unless an arrest is made and the arrest form or other documentation, which does indicate race, is attached to the Use of Force reporting form.

In the 1,434 exclusive Level 1 incidents, there were 38 injuries to subjects from the Level 1 use of force. This is similar to the 30 injuries to subjects that occurred in 2020. Of those injuries, 0 subjects required hospital treatment and 30 subjects who had minor injuries and were treated at scene by responding medics. There were 43 officers injured in the same set of incidents, 7 requiring hospital treatment and 36 who sustained minor injuries.

Assaults on Officers and Resulting Officer Injuries

This section examines intentional assaults on officers that were investigated by the Columbus Division of Police Major Crimes Bureau. The incidents examined here are those assaults specifically investigated for felony assault on a police officer where there is the potential for a suspect to be indicted. This information is vital for instructors that teach use of force and subject control.

For example, over 75% of the time an officer is feloniously assaulted, the suspect either strikes or spits on the officer (bodily fluids). This means that officers are assaulted by suspects within a very close distance, likely under 3 feet. Training can impact the safety of officers within that close range. The Police Tactical Boxing program not only teaches officers how to properly strike, but also, and perhaps most importantly, teaches officers proper defense from spontaneous assaults.



Without proper training within close range of a subject, an officer may not be prepared for the most common types of attacks.

In 2021, there were 74 incidents in which 91 officers were assaulted. A closer look at these numbers indicate there were 71 incidents in which 88 Columbus, Ohio Division of Police Officers were assaulted. The Major Crimes Bureau also completed 3 cases involving officers from other jurisdictions. These cases were examined, but are not included

in the final numbers reflected below. This is a decrease from 2020. This could be attributed to no civil disturbances the Division encountered in 2021. In 2020, there were 111 incidents in which 140 officers were assaulted. This is a significant increase from the year before – nearly double the number of incidents in 2020 than in 2019. One factor to be considered was the civil unrest


the Division of Police encountered in late May and early June of 2020. By comparison, in 2019 there were 56 total incidents in which 73 officers were assaulted. There were 61 incidents in which 70 officers were assaulted in 2018, and 84 incidents involving 102 officers in 2017. The chart shows the day of the week that these incidents occurred in 2021.

In 2021, there were 12 female officers and 76 male officers assaulted – 13.6% and 86.4% respectively. In 2020, there were 12 female officers and 79 male officers assaulted – 13.18% and 86.81% respectively. Recall that the Division is comprised of 11% females and 89% males. From this, we can garner that females are assaulted at a greater rate than their male counterparts for the past two years.

The officers assaulted in 2021 had an average age of 37.66 and 8.84 years of service. The officers assaulted in 2020 had an average age of 37.31 years and 9.87 years of service. In 2019, the average officer age was 36.68 years, and the average experience was 8.42 years of service. The racial breakdown of officers in 2021 is as follows: 1 Asian officer, 13 black officers, 1 Hispanic Officer, 1 “Other” officer and 72 white officers. The percentages of officers assaulted by race are: 81.8% white, 14.7% black, 1.1% Asian, 1.1% Hispanic and 1.1% “Other”. The racial breakdown of the officers in 2020 is as follows: 2 Asian officers, 12 black officers, 2 Hispanic officers, and 124 white officers. The percentages of officers assaulted by race are: white 88.57%, black 8.57%, Asian and Hispanic 1.43% each. This shows us an increase in assaults on black police officers in 2021. In 2021, officers were assaulted in a many different ways.

In 2021, suspects in these incidents ranged in age from 13 to 67, with an average age of 31.61. Of the 71 incidents, there were 88 suspects. There were 60 male (68.18%) and 28 female (31.82%) suspects involved. In 2020, suspects in these incidents ranged in age from 12 to 53, with an average age of 27.99. Of the 111 incidents there were 140 suspects. There were 89 male and 33 female suspects involved, and 18 unknown suspects. In incidents in which the suspect was known, male suspects were involved in 72.95% of the assaults; females were involved in 27.05%. In 2021, the racial makeup of the suspects is as follows: 61 black; 23 white; 3 Hispanic; and 1 Asian. Black suspects accounted for 69.3% of suspects; white suspects accounted for 26.1%; Hispanic suspects accounted for 3.4%; and the Asian suspect accounted for 1.1%.

The chart below shows a breakdown:



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PART IX – VICTIM AND SUSPECT INFO

Officers make contact with individuals for a variety of reasons and under many different circumstances. The contact may be the result of a self-initiated activity, such as a traffic stop, in which the officer has witnessed a traffic violation; or, contact may be the result of having been dispatched to a location to investigate a specific crime or complaint. Dispatched calls for service are by far the more common circumstance in which officers have contact with members of the community every year. Officer-initiated activity was down by over 11% in 2021, therefore further limiting the times in which officers' self-initiated contact could have led to a use of force. From the incident descriptions as reported by supervisors on the Data Processing Worksheet, form U-10.164, the five most frequent incidents in which force was used in 2021 are described as "disturbance/fight," "calls for service," "crime committed," "domestic disturbance," and "mentally ill person" in that order. Numbers for the categories in the previous five years were similar. Some form of citizen-initiated contact was the second most frequently noted incident description in 2021. Since 2012, officer-initiated incidents have been steadily decreasing.

While the estimated black population of Columbus is approximately 29.2% in 2021, 51.7% of all tracked uses of force in 2021 were on subjects who identified as or were described as black. At first glance, there appears to be a racial disparity in uses of force on the overall population. However, when viewed considering the contacts that officers are making, and *why* those contacts are made, a distinguishable pattern emerges. Officers do not have contact with the entire population. In fact, a significant portion of the general population may have no contact with police, and therefore no chance whatsoever of being involved in a use of force incident. Instead of comparing use of force demographics to the population at large, it is more accurate to compare use of force demographics to the population with whom the officers are making contact when force is used. For example, suspects, arrestees, and, to a much smaller extent, victims and witnesses should be taken into consideration when analyzing force. This puts the uses of force in context with the nature of the contacts that officers are having. The following section of this report compares some crime victim and suspect demographics from 2021 with use of force information from 2021.

As stated above, each incident in which force has been used is categorized by incident description. While there are many different events that may be described as a "disturbance," "fight," "crime committed," or even "calls for service," there are several violent crimes that fall under these categories and would have to be categorized as such. An incident involving force against a murder suspect or a robbery arrestee could be categorized many different ways since "robbery" and "murder" are not available as incident descriptions. For this reason, use of force

demographics will be compared to suspect and arrestee demographics for all arrests; and compared to demographics for certain violent crimes in this section.

In taking this information in to account, it is important to note that the single biggest category of arrestee data is for “all other offenses” in the group “B” offenses. This category includes arrests that fall outside the specific violent crimes discussed later in this section. More importantly, this category includes resisting arrest – one of the most prevalent reasons for an officer to have used force in the first place. “All other crimes” accounts for over 70% of all arrests in 2021. UCR violent crimes, defined as Homicide, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Robbery, plus domestic violence accounted for the other arrests.

There are a number of reasons to include domestic violence incidents with the other defined UCR violent crimes. First, to classify an incident as domestic violence, there must have been some use or attempted use of actual violence upon the victim at some point. Second, the parties *must* have some domestic relationship as defined in the Ohio Revised Code.

When analyzing the demographics for suspects and arrestees and for uses of force, there is a consistency when it comes to both race and sex. Of all arrestees in 2021, about 66.51% were categorized as black and 28.63% were categorized as white, when race was known and reported. However, these figures do not take recidivism into account. It is not possible to tell from the data how many of the 10,649 total arrestees in 2021 were because the same individual person had been arrested multiple times in one year – something that can and does occur. Therefore, either race or sex categories may be disproportionately represented because of a smaller group of repeat suspects/arrestees. Of all of the UCR violent crimes plus domestic violence suspects/arrestees where suspect/arrestee race was known or reported, 65.90% were categorized as black, and 29.60% were categorized as white. Of those UCR violent crimes and domestic violence suspects/arrestees for which sex was known in 2021, 81.83% were reported to be male. This is compared to 76.44% in 2020 and 78.24% in 2019.

As for uses of force in 2021, just over half (51.73%) were to black subjects; roughly three-quarters (74.51%) were to males. It is clear that males and black subjects make up a greater number of use of force subjects, as well as all custodial arrests. Males and blacks also make up a greater number and proportion of identified suspects/arrestees. This is true regarding locally reported UCR violent crimes as well as all arrestees in general (across all local crimes and incidents). This demonstrates some consistency in interactions that do not, initially, involve the police. When the police are interviewing a cooperative victim or witness, it is that victim or witness who typically provides the description of a suspect’s sex and race. The individual officer does not generally make that determination.

| 2021 Suspects/Arrestees by Race: UCR Violent Crimes and Domestic Violence | | | | | | |
|--|------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------|----------------|-----------|
| Suspect Race | COMBINED CRIMES | Agg. Assault | Homicide | Rape | Robbery | DV |
| Black | 66.51% | 74.92% | 83.91% | 65.33% | 72.06% | 63.37% |
| White | 28.63% | 22.26% | 12.64% | 26.66% | 26.33% | 30.84% |
| All Others | 1.27% | 0.94% | 2.30% | 5.35% | 0.46% | 1.31% |
| Unknown | 3.58% | 1.88% | 1.15% | 2.66% | 1.15% | 4.48% |

In Columbus in 2021, whites made up approximately 28.63% of suspects and arrestees for UCR violent crimes and domestic violence. In domestic violence incidents alone in 2021, whites account for 30.84% of suspects. Whites received 26.25% of all tracked uses of force by all races including unknown/crowd uses.

Force is used on each demographic at approximately the same rate that each demographic is identified as a suspect or arrestee in the UCR violent crimes and domestic violence. However, whites account for a greater percentage of all arrests. In other words, the apparent disproportionate distribution of force recipients and suspect demographics is not similarly reflected in arrest data.

| 2021 Victims by Race: UCR Violent Crimes and Domestic Violence | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------|----------------|-----------|
| Victim Race | ALL CRIMES | Agg. Assault | Homicide | Rape | Robbery | DV |
| Black | 41.03% | 69.13% | 79.83% | 42.23% | 44.94% | 57.62% |
| White | 44.09% | 23.83% | 17.98% | 45.70% | 44.84% | 36.47% |
| All Others | 1.49% | 0.4% | 0.07% | 1.10% | 2.19% | 1.31% |
| Unknown | 13.39% | 6.64% | 2.25% | 10.96% | 8.03% | 4.60% |

The breakdown of victims in 2021 by race follows: 41.03% identified or reported as black, and 44.09% identified or reported as white. The remainder was either unknown, Asian/Pacific Islander, or American Indian/Alaskan Native. In all UCR crimes and domestic violence, the percentage of black victims was higher than the percentage of white victims in each category except rape. See the chart above for the breakdown of victims by race, and the racial breakdown of victims in each of the crime categories observed.

Finally, the chart below compares demographics of use of force recipients, UCR violent crimes (homicide, aggravated assault, rape, robbery) and domestic violence suspects and arrestees, and all arrestees (excluding racial and sex unknowns in each category, if applicable.)

| 2021 | Uses of Force | UCR Crimes + DV | All Arrests |
|---------------------|----------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| Female | 10.42% | 18.16% | 22.91% |
| Male | 74.51% | 81.83% | 77.07% |
| Unknown/Crowd | 15.05% | 0% | 0.02% |
| All other non-white | 6.19% | 4.50% | 0.96% |
| Black | 51.73% | 65.90% | 57.09% |
| White | 26.25% | 29.60% | 37.76% |
| Unknown/Crowd | 15.83% | 0% | 4.20% |

2021 USE OF FORCE ANALYSIS – YEAR END REVIEW

PART X – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS


Conclusions and Recommendations

In 2021, officers used force 242 times while responding to 433,669 incidents which equates to 1 use of force in every 1,792 incidents. Only 0.056% of incidents resulted in a use of force. Further, 13 incidents, or 0.0029%, resulted in an officer discharging their firearm at another person.

Annual training continues to focus on various aspects of using force including de-escalation and officer safety.

Recommendations

1. Revised policy requires officers to intervene when they witness excessive force. The Training Bureau has and will continue to incorporate scenarios to reinforce this policy.
2. Training on punches, kicks, and impact weapons strikes will continue to focus on target acquisition. This specified training is to reduce or eliminate injuries to both suspects and officers.
3. De-escalation is now integrated with all use of force training in both classroom and scenario-based learning environments.
4. Use of force on persons who suffer from mental illness will continue to be emphasized. In 2021 there were seventeen uses of force on the mentally ill, though consistent in recent years, it remains a focus of the Division and the Training Bureau.
5. “In 2021, the CEW was effective 70.5% of the time for all deployments and cycles attempted. This is slightly down from 2020. In 2020, the CEW was effective 71.06% of the time for all deployments and cycles attempted. In 2019, the CEW was effective 77.61% of the time for all deployments and cycles attempted. This is a continued improvement over the 72% effectiveness for deployments and cycles attempted in 2018 and 69% effectiveness in 2017. The 70.8% effectiveness in 2021 is slightly below the 72.25% unweighted average effectiveness of 2017-2020.” These positive results can be directly attributed to training as effectiveness and specifically drive stun follow up percentages have been down in recent years. Therefore this year the Defensive Tactics Unit will continue to train on the fundamental of probe mode deployment during a foot pursuit.
6. The use of Body Worn Cameras to document the incident and the observations of the involved officers will continue in 2022.



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